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‘Creeping’ civil war 
in the North Caucasus
Wojciech Górecki
Over the last year, the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus has become 
further destabilised. Attacks and armed clashes happen daily, and destabi-
lisation is spreading to an increasingly large area. The extent of violence in 
the region is so great that it can already be stated that a de facto civil war 
is taking place, the warring parties being the Islamic armed underground 
movement which operates under the banner of the so-called Emirate of the 
North Caucasus, and the secular governments of the individual republics, 
who are supported by local and federal branches of the Russian Federatio-
n’s Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service.
Moscow has no idea how to successfully tackle the Caucasus rebellion. 
Force has proved to be costly and unproductive, while the attempts made 
since early 2010 to integrate the region with the rest of Russia by imple-
menting development programmes have not brought the desired results, 
because of widespread corruption and faint interest from businessmen 
who are afraid to invest in such an unsafe region. A growing problem for 
Moscow, particularly for the prestige of the state, is attacks by militants on 
areas near Sochi, where the 2014 Winter Olympics is to take place.
It must be assumed that over the next 3 years before the Olympics, 
Moscow’s priority in the region will be to ensure the safety of Olympic 
preparations, and then the games themselves. It cannot be ruled out that 
the North Caucasus Federal District with its ‘troubled republics’ will be 
surrounded by a kind of cordon sanitaire (Sochi is situated in the neighbo-
uring Southern Federal District). This could in turn strengthen these repu-
blics’ isolation, maintain the state of permanent instability, and postpone 
the prospects of solving the region’s acute economic and social problems.
The region’s ongoing destabilisation
The level of security in the North Caucasus has been deteriorating steadily since autumn 
2007, when the Chechen national liberation movement finally changed its character and evo-
lved into a pan-Caucasian front for global jihad. Up to late 2009, most acts of violence were 
carried out in Dagestan and Ingushetia, and slightly fewer in Chechnya; later the geographic 
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coverage of the attacks began gradually spreading to Kabardino-Balkaria1 and North Ossetia2. 
The militants have also intensified their activity in Chechnya itself3.
In 2010, as a result of terrorist attacks and clashes between members of the underground 
and law enforcement agencies in the region, nearly 750 people were killed, an average 
of more than 2 fatalities a day (the number of injured was several times higher)4. Moreover, 
in two terrorist attacks conducted by Caucasian terrorists on two metro stations in Moscow 
(29 March 2010), 40 people were killed and nearly 90 injured.
The dynamics of the deteriorating situation can be shown best by the example of Dagestan, 
the largest republic in the North Caucasus.
Victims of terrorist attacks and clashes 
with the armed underground movement in Dagestan
2009 2010
Civilians
killed 51 78
injured 39 107
Law enforcement agencies’ officers
killed 82 124
injured 136 200
Militants
killed 130 176
detained 29 41
TOTAL killed and injured 438 685
During the first weeks of 2011, the trend observed in the previous year was maintained and 
even strengthened. In January 48 people were killed in the North Caucasus, and 37 more 
lost their lives in a terrorist attack on Moscow’s Domodedovo airport on 24 January. Betwe-
en 18 and 20 February the militants carried out a series of attacks in Kabardino-Balkaria, 
in which 4 tourists from Moscow were killed and a cable railway in Elbrus was damaged. 
On 25 February several groups of militants simultaneously attacked a number of buildings 
in the republic’s capital, Nalchik. The desta-
bilisation of Kabardino-Balkaria is a source 
of growing concern for the government, 
as it is located relatively close to Sochi, whe-
re the 2014 Winter Olympics are to take 
place (the distance from the surroundings of 
Elbrus to Krasnaya Polana, where most of 
the races will take place, is about 200 km 
as the crow flies). The total number of pe-
ople killed in the region in February is 59.
The extent and intensity of the violence suggest that the armed conflict taking place in the 
North Caucasus is in fact a civil war. One side is the Islamic militants, and the other is 
the governments of the region’s individual republics, who are supported by local and federal 
branches of the Russian Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service.
The armed conflict’s parties
Militants
The group which has claimed responsibility for most of the attacks and other acts of terror is 
the so-called Emirate of the North Caucasus, a virtual Islamic ‘state’ established in autumn 
2007 by Dokku Umarov, who appointed himself ‘emir’ while resigning as ‘president’ of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and announcing the end of its existence. This was final confir-
1 The most notorious acts there 
included the demolition 
of the hydro-electric power 
plant on the Baksan river 
(21 July 2010) and the mur-
der of the republic’s 
mufti Anas Pshikhachev 
(15 December 2010).
2  In an attack on a market in 
Vladikavkaz, the republic’s 
capital, on 9 September 2010, 
18 people were killed 
and 160 injured.
3 Members of the armed under-
ground movement carried out 
an attack on Tsentoroy, 
the home village of the repu-
blic’s head Ramzan Kadyrov 
(29 August 2010), 
and the Chechen Parliament 
in Grozny (19 October 2010).
4 In this work, the author’s 
own calculations are based 
on information published 
on the Memorial-run website 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/, 
which provides the most com-
prehensive and reliable data 
on this issue.
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mation that the ethnic separatist movement restricted to one republic has transformed into 
a separatism based on religion, and has expanded to the entire North Caucasus.
The Emirate has never been a centralised structure, but rather a banner under which groups 
of militants operate; they share the ideas propagated by Umarov and formally recognise his 
authority, but have significant autonomy5. The number of ‘professional’ fighters permanen-
tly stationed in mountain bases is probably as few as several hundred across the region6 
(those who are killed are constantly replaced by new ones). Much more numerous – although 
hard to assess – is the strength of the ‘support team’ responsible for propaganda activities 
(such as running websites) and broadly understood logistics. It is even harder to assess the 
number of sympathisers to the Emirate, who are ready to put a militant up for the night, 
lend him their car7, or possibly take part in a single action. The Emirate is financed by global 
centres of jihad, and with protection money extorted from Caucasian entrepreneurs operating 
in the region and elsewhere.
The loose structure of the Emirate, together with its lack of rigid hierarchy and coordination 
between groups of militants, prevent them from organising large-scale attacks such as seizing 
a town; but on the other hand, these factors make it more difficult for the state to fight the in-
surgents. The elimination of several leading 
underground figures in 2010, such as Anzor 
Astemirov and Said Buryatsky, has not de-
creased the number of attacks. It can be 
assumed that even the elimination of Dokku 
Umarov would not significantly undermine 
the Emirate’s military potential.
According to the ‘Emir’s statements, 
the militants’ main goal is to actually se-
parate the North Caucasus from Russia 
and establish a religious state governed by 
the principles of sharia law. The main enemy 
of the Emirate is the Russian government and the Russian public which supports it. Umarov 
has also stressed that the Caucasus is part of the ummah (the community of all Muslims 
worldwide), and that the activity of the Emirate is in line with global jihad8. In practice, 
the militants’ main enemy is the governments of the individual republics, who – in the mi-
litants’ opinion – embody not only apostasy but also treachery, as they oppress their own 
nations at Moscow’s behest. The victims of the terrorist attacks are principally the representa-
tives of the republics’ governments, the region’s official Muslim clergy and officers of the law 
enforcement structures. Outside the region, the militants’ spectacular attacks are primarily 
designed to be a demonstration of force (as has happened in Moscow).
Local governments and law enforcement agencies
The republics of the North Caucasus are governed by clan-based and mafia-type groups 
which are detached from their own societies but tolerated by Moscow. The latter only very 
rarely decides to dismiss a representative of the region’s ruling elite (the exceptions were In-
gushetia’s president Murat Zyazikov, dismissed in autumn 2008, and Boris Ebzeyev, the head 
of Karachay-Cherkessia, dismissed in late February 2011). These elites blackmail Moscow 
by giving the impression that they are the sole guarantors of a given republic’s stability and 
secular character. On the other hand, the federal government usually provides unconditional 
support for the local elites, and only sporadically engages in a dialogue with independent gro-
ups, such as NGOs. According to Akhmed Yarlykapov from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ 
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, the local governments have been regularly appro-
priating the budget funds transferred to the Caucasus, as they see this money as their due 
payment, as well as a sign of Moscow’s weakness9.
5 In 2010, at least ten Emirate 
commanders under the le-
adership of Hussein Gakayev 
refused obedience to Umarov. 
Moreover, a number of fully 
autonomous groups operate 
in the North Caucasus.
6 According to General Nikolai 
Rogozhkin, the chief of the 
Internal Troops of the Interior 
Ministry, the number of mili-
tants is about 500. Vladimir 
Mukhin, ‘Nurgalieva usilili arti-
leriyei’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
6 December 2010.
7 Such decisions may come 
quite easily, as solidarity 
with one’s family clan or 
neighbours is deeply rooted 
in the Caucasian societies.
 
 
 
8 Umarov’s video declarations 
are published by 
http://www.kavkazcenter.com/
9 Source: Akhmet Yarlykapov’s 
statement during the seminar 
at the Centre for Eastern Stu-
dies (OSW) on 9 April 2010: 
“Should this money run out, 
local elites would feel 
exempt from any loyalty 
to the federal government.”
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The representatives of the republics’ 
governments, the official Muslim cler-
gy and officers of the law enforcement 
structures are the most common victims 
of terrorist attacks in the Caucasus. 
Outside the region, the militants’ spec-
tacular attacks are primarily designed 
to be a demonstration of force.
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The units responsible for fighting militants include the Internal Troops of the Russian Interior 
Ministry10, as well as units subordinated to the individual republics’ Interior Ministries and 
units of the Federal Security Service (some of which are directly subordinate to the FSS’s le-
adership in Moscow, and some to its local branches). A complicated system of interrelations 
among the services, as well as conflicts of loyalty (officers of the local Interior Ministries usu-
ally belong to the titular nationalities, but there are exceptions to this rule among the senior 
management of these Ministries) reduces the efficiency of these structures’ operations.
The units subordinated to the Russian 
Ministry of Defence (which is not represen-
ted at the republican level) have not partici-
pated in operations against the militants sin-
ce 2002. The army occasionally lends heavy 
military equipment such as tanks to Interior 
Ministry units for individual operations, ma-
inly in Dagestan. Therefore, the army cannot 
be considered a party in this conflict.
Social background
It is hard to assess the mood of the civilian population, but widespread dislike of the corrupt 
bureaucracy together with the region’s rapid Islamisation11 have led to the assumption that 
the militants have popular understanding, if not the sympathy. The ongoing demodernisation 
of the North Caucasus (the return of social institutions which existed in the region before the 
Russian conquest in the 19th century) and its de-Russification (Russian language and culture 
are being expelled from the public space) also work in favour of the militants. Another factor 
that aids them is the law enforcement agencies’ violations of the rights of Muslims on a mass 
scale, by persecuting (apprehending, beating, brutally interrogating) believers, for example 
bearded men. Having experienced such persecution, these people often join the radicals. 
Also, some representatives at the lowest level of local administrations (in villages and small 
towns) certainly sympathise with the militants12.
The failure of the ‘carrot and stick’ policy
The situation as presented above has developed after years of neglect and abandonment. 
No ruling Russian government has yet succeeded in working out a coherent strategy for the 
region’s development. During Boris Yeltsin’s rule (1991–1999), Moscow’s policy was mostly 
reactive – the Kremlin merely responded to the course of events in the Caucasus. When 
Vladimir Putin took power and the ‘second Chechen war’ broke out in 1999, the government 
chose a ‘force model’ for managing the region that required the constant presence of Russian 
armed forces. Extensive costs and lack of tangible results forced this policy to become more 
flexible. It is then that the concept of ‘Chechenisation’ was born, under which the republic’s 
government received broad autonomy: former militants were amnestied and the role of Islam 
in political and social life was increased, among other measures. This stabilisation was achie-
ved at the cost of the Chechen presidents Akhmed Kadyrov and his son Ramzan eliminating 
any internal opposition, but it allowed the anti-terror regime in Chechnya (which had been in 
force for nearly 10 years) to be lifted (on 16 April 2009). However, by that time, most of the 
active militants were already outside the republic.
10 A year ago, there were 
23,000 soldiers 
of the Internal Troops 
of the Interior Ministry de-
ployed in the North Caucasus 
(Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Bessilye 
antiterrora’, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta 31 March 2010). 
In 2010 this number incre-
ased (Vladimir Mukhin, 
‘Nurgalieva...’, op.cit.).
11 According to assessments, 
up to 10% of young people 
in the North Caucasus repu-
blics when asked about their 
ethnicity declare themselves 
to be of ‘Muslim nationality’ 
(ibidem). According to the 
expert, a process 
of ‘shariatisation’ in the area, 
i.e. increasingly widespread 
use of Muslim law in everyday 
life, can be said to be ongoing.
12 Following the attacks 
in Kabardino-Balkaria 
on 18–20 February 2011, 
Aleksandr Khloponin, the pre-
sidential envoy to the North 
Caucasus federal district, 
said that these governments 
had not reacted adequately 
to the existing threats (thus 
suggesting that they did not 
inform the relevant structures 
about the places of residence 
and the movement of militants 
which they had in fact 
been aware of).
No Russian government has yet 
succeeded in working out a coherent 
strategy for the region’s develop-
ment. The methods of force which 
Moscow has applied for over 
a decade have proved unproductive.
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Processes analogous to ‘Chechnisation’ were supposed to cover the entire region, but except 
for Chechnya no leader was found who – as Ramzan Kadyrov did – was able to take full 
control of his republic. In the face of the failure of the previously adopted policy (the armed 
underground movement was not eliminated), and in response to a new wave of terrorist at-
tacks, the government decided to change its ‘stick’ to a ‘carrot’, and to foster the economic 
development of the region. Moscow believed that the ‘economisation’ of its policy towards 
the North Caucasus would help solve problems such as structural unemployment (which 
according to official statistics is 16% on average, and 50% in Chechnya), underinvestment, 
overpopulation (the highest birth rate in the country), land shortages, poverty, and corruption. 
The improvement of living standards – by extra budget allocations and investments, especially 
in the tourism sector – was to stabilise the situation and reduce migration to Moscow and 
other Russian cities.
A turning point in the Russian government’s tactics was President Medvedev’s decision of 
19 January 2010 to separate the North Caucasus federal district from the South federal district. 
The new district comprises seven administrative units of the Russian Federation: Dagestan, 
Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and the Sta-
vropol Krai (Adygea and the Krasnodai Krai, where Sochi is located, are among the repu-
blics that remained in the South federal 
district). The postition of the presidential 
envoy to the new district was entrusted 
to the economist Aleksandr Khloponin, 
a former governor of the Krasnoyarsk Krai 
in Siberia who had the reputation of a skil-
ful manager. At the same time, Khloponin 
was nominated deputy Prime Minister 
in the federal government.
After several weeks in office, Khloponin presented a new concept called ‘Peak 5642’ (refer-
ring to Mount Elbrus), which offered a comprehensive program for tourism and winter sports 
development in the North-Western Caucasus. The entire program was to cost $12-13 billion. 
However, the concept was not followed up by a more detailed document.
Khloponin’s achievement was the preparation of the ‘Strategy for the North Caucasus’s de-
velopment by 2025’, which Prime Minister Vladimir Putin endorsed on 6 September 2010. 
The strategy outlined the reduction of unemployment to 5% and a 2.5-fold increase in sa-
laries. Private Russian and foreign capital was to carry out investment programmes in the 
region, which would receive extra financial support from the Development Corporation of the 
North Caucasus, established by the state-owned Vneshekonombank.
The adoption of this strategy coincided with an escalation of terrorist attacks. Apart from 
threats to personal safety (the Emirate warned it would attack people who cooperated with 
the government), businessmen were scared off by the dysfunctional socio-economic system 
that has developed in the North Caucasus, based on corrupt clan-based and mafia-type 
relations, which Khloponin did not succeed in combating. Moreover, not having dealt with the 
Caucasus before, he came into conflict with Ramzan Kadyrov, which paralysed his activity 
in Chechnya. Therefore, even though the North Caucasus’ tourist and business potential was 
promoted by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin themselves, there is a great risk 
that the precepts of the ‘strategy’ will never be implemented in reality.
A year of carrying out the ‘economisation’ policy in the Caucasus has not brought any tangible 
results. The involvement of serious investors in the North Caucasus is restricted to Olympic 
facilities and the accompanying infrastructure around Sochi.
The North Caucasus’ tourist and 
business potential has been promoted 
by President Medvedev and Prime 
Minister Putin themselves. However, 
investors have been scared off by 
corruption and the lack of security.
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13 Georgia understands this, 
and is therefore trying to 
loosen this control by making 
attempts to draw the North 
Caucasus nations closer. 
To do so, Tbilisi has lifted 
the visa regime for people who 
are registered as residents 
in the North Caucasus, has 
launched a Russian-language 
TV channel called First Cauca-
sian (PIK), organised several 
international conferences de-
voted to the North Caucasus, 
and offered North Caucasian 
young people an interesting 
education programme 
(studies in Russian), etc.
The Olympic context
The establishment of the North Caucasus federal district has symbolically separated Sochi 
from the North Caucasus. The creation of relevant district authorities and agencies may also 
help to give the Games additional security. Apart from the threat of terrorist attacks by the 
Emirate, the likelihood of which should be deemed significant and growing steadily, it cannot 
be ruled out that another risk for the Olympics will come from radical Circassian groups from 
Russia and abroad. These groups hold that a genocide of Circassians took place on the ter-
ritory of the current Krasnodar Krai in the 19th century; it is estimated that about half of the 
Circassian population, a total of up to 2 million people, died during the Caucasian War or were 
deported to Turkey. Organising the games 
in the place where the Russian army mas-
sacred the Circassian population and held 
a victory parade (on 21 May 1864 in Kra-
snaya Polyana) is treated as a desecration 
of the victims’ memory. So far, the Circas-
sians have confined themselves to peace-
ful protests, but violent actions cannot be 
ruled out in the future.
Another adversary of the Winter Olympics in Sochi is Georgia. Tbilisi has repeatedly pointed 
out that Russia has been using the territory of separatist Abkhazia during preparations for the 
Games by fetching construction materials from there and by planning to use Abkhazian hotels 
to accommodate the competitors. Tbilisi has also signalled that the construction of some 
Olympic infrastructure is affecting the ecological balance in this part of the Caucasus, an opi-
nion shared by Russian environmentalists. On 25 November 2010 the Georgian parliament 
set up a special committee to monitor the preparations for the Games. By doing so, Tbilisi 
will try to prove that Russia is violating the provisions of the Olympic Charter, Georgia’s pro-
bable intention being to cause a boycott of the Olympics. Probably to prevent this scenario, 
President Medvedev suggested on 18 February 2011 that Georgia may be ‘behind all sorts 
of provocations’ aimed at destabilising the Games.
The Caucasus: essential, but increasingly alien
Russia’s relations with Georgia and the entire South Caucasus are another factor that affects 
the situation in the North Caucasus. In the 19th century Russia conquered this region in order 
to be able to control Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which had earlier been included in the 
Russian Empire. Similarly, in order to maintain its current influence in the South Caucasus, 
it seems necessary for Moscow to fully control the North Caucasus13. PImportant energy 
and communication routes run via the North Caucasus (such as the Baku-Novorossiysk oil 
pipeline, and highways to Armenia and Iran). Moreover, this is a seaside area that stret-
ches between the Black and the Caspian Seas, with important ports (Makhachkala), airports 
(Mineralnye Vody), health resorts (Pyatigorsk, Essentuki), and the only winter sports bases 
in the European part of Russia (in the regions around Sochi and Mount Elbrus).
These circumstances indicate that the stability of the region is crucial for Moscow, and in the 
long run this stability cannot be achieved without integrating the region with the rest of the 
country. Meanwhile, the opposite process is underway – the North Caucasus is becoming 
increasingly isolated, and its ‘alienation’ from Russia’s civilisational, cultural and social space 
is progressing. The situation is beginning to resemble its status in the 19th century, when 
it was treated as an ‘internal colony’. An illustration of this is a growing xenophobia among 
Russians, which manifests itself in recurring attacks in Moscow and other Russian cities 
on people arriving from the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Apart from the threat of terrorist 
attacks, whose likelihood should be 
defined as significant, it cannot be ru-
led out that radical Circassian groups 
will take different actions aimed 
against the Olympics.
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14 For example, see Islam 
Tekushev, ‘Terakt. A v otvet 
tishina...’, Caucasus Times, 
26 January 2011 
(http://www.caucasustimes.
com/article.asp?id=20735; 
accessed on 8 March 2011). 
Tekushev writes: “Over 15 
years of confrontation, the 
Russian North Caucasus has 
become a hostile ‘near abroad’ 
for the majority of Russians. 
(…) On the other hand, 
for residents of the North Cau-
casus, the remaining part 
of Russia has also become 
a hostile territory, where Cau-
casian national dances (such 
as the lezginka) are treated 
almost like a demonstration 
of aggression or superiority.”
15 For example, see Sergey Marke-
donov, ‘Uyti nelzya’, Gazeta.ru, 
21 December 2010 
(http://www.gazeta.ru/ 
comments/2010/12/21 
_a_3472821.shtml; 
accessed on 8 March 2011).
16 Yarlykapov’s statement, 
op.cit.: “Moscow thinks in ca-
tegories of national republics, 
and has been trying to find 
a solution which would take 
into account the Caucasus’ 
ethnic divisions. However, 
a just and fair ‘parity’, ensu-
ring that all Caucasian nations 
are proportionally represented 
in the local governments, 
is not possible, as it is virtually 
impossible to satisfy 
all the claims and demands. 
What is needed is an idea that 
would unite all communities. 
Muslim radicals have already 
figured that out.” Another 
statement was made by 
the political scientist Geydar 
Jemal: “The [central] govern-
ment is inciting the Caucasian 
nations against itself and 
creating ethnic tension by 
separating peoples into ethnic 
territories.” G. Dzhemal, 
‘Vlast razvodit ludey na 
Kavkaze po natsionalnym 
terrotoryam’, Kavkazskiy Uzel, 
22 February 2011 
(http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/
articles/181372; 
accessed on 8 March 2011).
More and more experts have pointed out that for a growing number of Russians, the North 
Caucasus is becoming a sort of ‘alien body’ within their country, while ever more residents of 
the Caucasus share the conviction that Russia is not their home country14. In 2010, Russian 
political journalism witnessed a resurgence in enquiries – unseen since the 1990s – concer-
ning the possibility of Moscow abandoning the North Caucasus, and the probable consequ-
ences thereof15.
What next: isolation instead of integration?
Within the next three years, Moscow’s priority will surely be to safely prepare for and carry 
out the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. This is a matter of prestige for the state, 
and there is no doubt that Russia will do anything to hold the Games, in the first place, 
and secondly to reduce all sorts of risks, including terrorist attacks, as much as possible. 
The probable scenarios include the creation of a kind of cordon sanitaire around the North 
Caucasus federal district, which could be 
similar to a well-guarded border in the 
Cold War period. To guard the border, 
military units subordinated to the Ministry 
of Defence may be involved, the Russian 
military presence in Abkhazia may be re-
inforced, and the protection of the Black 
Sea coastline strengthened. A special ope-
rational headquarters, which is expected to 
start operating in January 2012, will take 
care of the Olympic Games security. This may help in preventing terrorist attacks, as it is 
almost certain that the Emirate will attempt to do so (the sites of recent attacks have been 
symbolically ‘approaching’ Sochi).
In the long run, it seems impossible to solve the problems of the North Caucasus and to rein-
tegrate it with the Russian legal, economic, social and cultural space without the development 
of a comprehensive approach to the region. While doing so, Moscow should not be guided by 
the ‘divide and conquer’ principle, as illustrated by its arbitrary delimitation of administrative 
boundaries of the Russian Federation’s Caucasian republics (and smaller local entities)16. 
It is also essential for Moscow to start a dialogue with independent communities and with-
draw its unconditional support for the local elites. Otherwise, it may prove to be extremely 
difficult to keep the North Caucasus in Russia’s political space.
The North Caucasus is becoming 
increasingly ‘alienated’ from Russia’s 
civilisational, cultural and social 
space. The current situation 
in the region recalls its status 
in the 19th century, when it was 
treated as an ‘internal colony’.
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